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Abstract
This study aims to examine urban zoning within a linear city in a Bertrand 
duopolistic competition framework with price discrimination and linear 
transportation costs. It analyses the effects of introducing an environmental area 
where economic and residential activity are not allowed. The welfare function used 
to determine the optimal size of the green area allows for a possible regulator’s 
bias in favour of firms/consumers. It is shown that location-price competition can 
be either reduced or increased depending on the size of the green area. The results 
indicate when a regulator implements green zoning, under linear transportation 
costs, influences the optimal location of firms (because these locations depend on 
the size of the green zone). In consequence, zoning may be used as an effective 
industrial or urban policy tool. 
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JEL classification: D43, L13, R38, Q58
1. Introduction
Urban zoning refers to the practice of dividing the city into reserved sections 
for specific uses such as, environmental, residential, commercial or industrial. 
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This article examines a spatial discrimination framework to analyse alternatives 
to establish an environmental area inside the city where economic activity and 
residential use are not permitted. This model introduces the effects of zoning on 
both firms’ competition and consumers’ utility level is considered.
Today about 55% of the world’s population lives in cities; but in 2050 around two-
thirds will reside in urban areas. Then the urban planning is a crucial issue for 
public administrations. There are, of course, many areas on which to focus attention 
on the planning strategy of cities of tomorrow. One of them is related with the idea 
that economic competitiveness must be based on the environmental sustainability 
of the cities (European Commission, 2011). 
In this sense, we are interested in analysing the effects of implementing a green 
zone in the city as much on the benefits of the companies as on the well-being of 
the citizens. On the one hand, when considering sites for new business premises 
firms are influenced by incentives and restraints from policy makers to establish 
their activities. At the same time city-planners often face a trade-off when trying 
to serve divergent interests from different economic agents. Zoning, thus, becomes 
a useful instrument to plan rational occupation of spaces by redirecting businesses 
away from locations where their presence is deemed incompatible with certain 
policy objectives. On the other hand, large cities around the world face this type 
of zoning decisions when introducing new green areas, because it offers benefits 
for residents mainly related to health effects (World Health Organization, 2016), 
but also with other related with the enhancing sustainable urbanization (European 
Commission, 2015).
All of this shows the importance of providing an analysis on one of the fundamental 
aspects of this urban policy, such as the size of the green zone and its economic, 
environmental and congestion effects. Our research is interesting because it allows 
one to compute the optimal size of a green zoning in a realistic scenario.
This study introduces a green zoning in a Hotelling’s linear city in a spatial 
competition context à la Bertrand. The main starting assumptions of the model 
with price discrimination (such as linear transport costs) were formalized in 
Hurter and Lederer (1985) and Lederer and Hurter (1986). We expand this 
model by introducing elements related to zoning regulation and its impact on the 
environment. We introduce a regulatory authority whose welfare function is equal 
to a linear combination of the firms’ profits and the consumers’ total surplus and 
we allow it to change depending on whether the regulator wants to benefit more 
from firms or consumers. We consider a utility function that incorporates the effects 
of the green zone in a more complex albeit realistic way. In the utility function a 
positive externality is included in order to pick the effect of improvements in the 
environment. Moreover, a negative externality arises because it diminishes the 
space for residential area increasing the congestion.
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Our aim is to determine the optimal zoning decision of the social planner under 
these conditions that modify behaviour of companies and consumers. The model 
is a first step towards capturing the relationship between transportation costs, the 
degree of consumer satisfaction, and the bias from the regulator because all of these 
hypotheses determine the optimal dimension of the green area. 
In sum, the hypothesis that we want to validate is whether a green zoning regulation 
changes the equilibrium. If so, then we calculate the impacts on the optimal 
locations and the equilibrium prices of the firms. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature 
review. Section 3 describes methodology to model and compute the equilibrium in 
location. Section 4 presents the analysis, the results and discusses two cases. On 
the one hand, the case of pure market effects and the general case in which the 
regulator takes into account both effects (i.e. market effects vs. green zone). Finally, 
section 5 presents the conclusions and explores some policy implications. 
2. Literature review
The literature on spatial discrimination à la Hotelling considers two main types 
of competition: Cournot (quantity) and Bertrand (price) competition. The analysis 
via quantities4 in the linear city goes back to Hamilton et al. (1989). Many other 
studies have followed this approach (Anderson and Neven, 1991; Gupta et al., 
1997; Chamorro-Rivas, 2000; Benassi et al., 2007). The analysis via prices or price 
discrimination was first developed by Hoover (1937) and Lerner and Singer (1937). 
Other authors have extended their results to a more formal framework such as 
Hurter and Lederer (1985) and Lederer and Hurter (1986).5
The literature on zoning within a spatial competition framework also includes 
the analysis in terms of quantity and price competition. One of the first models 
on Bertrand competition is found in Lai and Tsai (2004), in the same vein more 
recent works are Hamoudi and Risueño (2012), and Bárcena and Casado (2014). 
For the case of Cournot competition models other authors such as Matsumura and 
Shimizu (2005), Chen and Lai (2008) or Colombo (2011, 2012) have explored the 
implications of introducing zoning.
The main focus of the spatial competition literature above mentioned is to determine 
the optimal choice of firm location. Depending on the assumptions and functional 
specifications from the models, different location patterns arise: dispersion, 
4 The first spatial competition studies à la Cournot was developed by Greenhut and Ohta (1975).
5 An excellent explanation of this type of models can be found in Anderson et al. (1992, chapter 8).
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agglomeration and/or intermediate paths.6 This study extends this approach one 
step further by analysing the key factors influencing the size of a regulated green 
area. In order to do so a three-stage game is solved through backward induction in 
which consumers, firms and the regulator interact to determine the optimal size of 
the area for different parameter values. 
Our study resembles Bárcena and Casado (2014) setup in the sense that these 
authors consider a regulator in the price discrimination model proposed by Hunter 
and Lederer. These authors introduce a regulator that does not decide the zoning 
dimension and fixes the possible locations for firms; in consequence, they only 
solve a two-stage game. However, we contemplate a more general model in several 
issues. Firstly, we introduce a regulator which chooses the optimal dimension of the 
green area. Therefore, our model is formalised as a three-stage game and it is solved 
as a three-stage game using backward induction. Secondly, we specify and evaluate 
the environmental and congestion effects of the green zoning regulation, that is, we 




A price-discrimination version of Hotelling’s linear city model is examined under 
a regulatory authority in charge of the design of a green area. Consumers and firms 
are not allowed to locate in the green area denoted by: [v1, v2]. This area is assumed 
to be located between both firms so that: 0 ≤ x1 ≤ v1 ≤ v2 ≤ x2 ≤ 1, where, x1, x2 
denote respectively the location of firm 1 and 2. The location space for consumers 
and firms is, therefore, defined as: I = [0, v1] ∪ [v2, 1]. Notice that the displacement 
through the green zone is authorized. We denoted by “ν” the length of a green area: 
v = v2 – v1; then v ∈ [0,1]. 
In general, the urban plans try to combine green spaces with a growing population 
density. Then the regulator should maintain the proportionality between the 
buildable volume and the free spaces that serve to make human life more adequate. 
Consequently, the extreme case that the whole city is a green area does not seem 
very realistic, that is, the case ν = 1 is far from reality. Therefore, hereafter we limit 
this case considering a maximum value equal to v̂ such that: v ≤ v̂ < 1. 
Both firms produce a homogeneous good at a constant marginal cost “c” and choose 
a mill price. The delivered price, pi(x, xi), i = 1, 2, depends on the location of the 
consumer x and the firm xi, However, for the sake of simplicity it will be denoted 
6 For a general idea on the results within different spatial competition setups see Biscaia and Mota (2013).
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as: pi(x), i = 1, 2. Following Hotelling (1929) a linear function is used to describe 
transport cost. The profit of firms is denoted by πi(v), i = 1, 2. 
There are N consumers uniformly distributed along I, each buys one unit of the 
product and their reserve price (S) is high enough to purchase the good. Surplus 
obtained when buying from the firm i will be: ei(x) = S – pi(x), i = 1, 2. The consumers’ 
total surplus ET(.) will be obtained by aggregating for the whole population, N.
The novelty of the model is the introduction of externalities associated with the 
green zone. Specifically, we consider two externalities due to environmental and 
congestion effects. 
– Environmental effect:
This effect is due to people valuing positively the environmental consequences 
derived from a green area in their city: pollution reduction, space for leisure, etc. 
In particular, a moderated interest on the environment is assumed, that is, we 
specify a decreasing marginal rate for that positive externality. The following 
concave7 function specifies this idea: h(v) = (–v2 + αv), α ≥ 0. Where the parameter 
α describes the degree of satisfaction the individual obtains from green zones. 
– Congestion effect: 
This effect is a consequence of population density in the urban space. The 
expression is given by: g(v) = β(1 – v)/N, β ∈ R+. The parameter β shows the 
satisfaction level for a consumer provided by an exclusively residential zone 
β = N g(0). The function g(v) is decreasing in ν8, that is, more green space means 
less residential space leading to higher congestion. 
Finally, both effects must be aggregated to quantify the total impact from a green 
area on consumer’s welfare in a function that is denoted as “quality of life”: im(v). 
It shows the trade-off between environmental advantages and a higher congestion 












 environmental congestion  
 effect effect
7 Concavity in function h(ν) shows a moderated interest on the environment with a decreasing marginal 
rate. For the convex case, h(ν) = ν2 + α ν; as well as the linear case, h(ν) = α ν, extreme solutions are 
found. 
8 Notice that g(v)/β is the inverse function of population density in the space of length (1– v).
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Where parameter α describes the degree of satisfaction obtained by an individual 
from green zones and β stands for the satisfaction level enjoyed by a consumer 
from an exclusively residential zone. On the other hand, v represents the length of a 
green area: v = v2 – v1.
A new formulation is given by: im(v) = –v2 + γv + β/N,   γ ∈ R, β ∈ R+, v ∈ [0, v̂].
Let γ = α – (β/N) be the parameter describing spatial preferences. It represents the bias 
from consumers towards an exclusively residential space when γ ≤ 0 or alternatively 
towards a space with a green area when γ ≥ 0. 













Following the specification in Hamoudi and Risueño (2012), the regulator has a 
bias for firms or consumer, his objective function is defined as10: 
W(v) = λ(π1(v) + π2(v) + (1 – λ)(ET(v) + Im(v)) (3)
In this function: λ, (0 ≤ λ ≤ 1), stands for the weight given by the regulator to firms’ 
profit, (π1(v) + π2(v)), in accordance with his/her political bias. Inversely, (1 – λ), 
is the weight given to consumers’ utility, (ET(v) + Im(v)). This functional form for 
welfare shows that when λ > 1/2, firm’s profit is more important than consumer’s 
disutility for global welfare and the opposite holds when λ < 1/2.
The model is formalised as a three stage-game. In the first stage, the regulator 
chooses the optimal size of the green area. In the second stage, firms simultaneously 
choose their locations; and at the final stage, firms decide on their prices. Backward 
induction will be employed to solve the equilibrium. As usual in these models, 
arbitrage among consumers is not allowed.
Equilibrium in prices is solved through competition à la Bertrand. The solution is 
similar to Hurter and Lederer (1985), and Lederer and Hurter (1986), such as we 
can see in equation (4) and Figure 1: 
9 Notice that the optimal size of green zone under exclusively environmental effects is associated to the 
extreme cases: 0 if  γ ≤ 0; 1 if γ ≥ 2 and γ/2  if 0 ≤ γ ≤ 2. 
10 Notice that we do not include in the model the cost for zoning because we are interested in 
environmental effects. In any case, to take into account this issue would add a budget restriction for 
social problem of the regulator doing more complex the problem solution, but it won’t change the 
main results.
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p1*(x) = p2*(x) = Max {c + t│x1 – x│, c + t│x2 – x│, (4)
for every x ∈ [0, v1] ∪ [v2, 1]
It should be highlighted that the optimization strategies of firms are not modified 
when a green zone is introduced. This type of equilibrium was first identified 
by Hoover (1937). With spatial price discrimination, the strategy set are much 
“broader” since each firm chooses a price function rather than a single mill price, 
that is, has more flexibility in its price choice. Given this equilibrium result, the 
market becomes segmented at v1, v2, firm 1 serves residential area [0, v1], and firm 
2 sells in [v2, 1]. Each company acts, consequently, each company acts as a de facto 
monopoly. Notice that when x1 = x2, the equilibrium delivered price equals the 
common supplying cost and firms make zero profits.




The result for equilibrium in prices is used in the second stage of the game to 
determine the optimal duopolistic location. Given the expression (4), the profit at 
each point is the equilibrium price minus the corresponding cost. Thus, the benefit 





























Profits for firm 1 Profits for firm 2
c c
v
x1 v1 v2 x2
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Firm’s profits are represented by the hatched area in figure 1.















This optimality results is not fortuitous. Since each firm behaves like a monopoly, 
the outcome corresponds to a midpoint location within its market. An important 
consequence here is that the regulator may use the size of the green area as an 
industrial policy tool to reduce monopoly power of firms, thus, increasing market 
competition. The profits of firms in equilibrium location are given by the following 
expressions:
π1*(v1, v2) = (tNv1/4(1 – (v2 – v1))) {–3v1 + 2v2 + 2} (7.a)
π2*(v1, v2) = (tN/4(1 – (v2 – v1))) {–3v22 + 2v2v1 + 2v2 – 2v1 + 1} (7.b)
Following Anderson et al. (1992: 328-329), we can prove that equilibrium locations 
are socially optimal. In fact, it can be shown that when no green area exists, 
v2 – v1, firms locate in equilibrium so x1* = 1/4, x2* = 3/4. In this case, v1 = v2 = 1/2 
and profits remain the same (equal to 3tN/16).
Given the above results, the planner will examine the optimal policies depending 
on the length of the green zone. However, the specification of social welfare 
(expression (3)) implicitly assumes that a regulator does not discriminate between 
both firms or amongst consumers. Thus, only the symmetrical case is considered 
henceforth: v1 + v2 = v̂. Under this assumption, the expressions for the optimal 
locations (6.a) and (6.b) are x1*(v) = 0.25 (1 – v) and x2*(v) = 0.25 (3 + v) that leading 









Notice that firm’s profits are increasing with the size of the green area and the 
transportation cost per unit of distance11, t. 
11	∀	v ∈[0,1], (∂πi*/∂v) > 0,	∀	t > 0, (∂πi*/∂t) > 0 
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Therefore, if firms can choose the dimension of the environmental area they would 
prefer the largest possible size (that is, ν = v̂). In this case, firms will be located as 
far away as possible from each other, (x1*(v) = 0.25 (1 – v̂) , x2*(v) = 0.25 (3 + v̂)). 
Competition is relaxed under this scenario and firms achieve “monopoly rents” 
which bring about maximum profits: π1*(1) = π2*(1) = 
N
2 t.
What happens to consumer’s surplus when a good is purchased given that the 
optimal location and prices have been modified due to the existence of a regulated 
area? Since the market is segmented it is necessary to distinguish between 
customers:















































































Consumers’ total surplus decreases with the size of the green area and the 
transportation cost per unit of distance12, t. As a result, if consumers could choose 
the optimal size for the non-urbanized area, they will prefer ν = 0. Subsequently, 
locations would be x1* = 1/4, x2* = 3/4, which are socially optimal for the two 
firms. An insight may be gained by not taking the benefits from the green are 
into consideration. Consumers will then prefer an entirely residential space 
which provides them with maximum level of utility: N(S – c – t/2). Their utility, 
nevertheless, diminishes as the transportation cost per unit of distance (t) increases 
given null environmental (positive) effects.
12 ∀	v ∈[0,1], (∂ET*/∂v) < 0,	∀	t > 0, (∂ET*/∂t) < 0
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4. Analysis, results and discussion
A key aspect in the model is the introduction of a regulator in charge of implementing 
the design of a green zone with length ν within the linear city. In this section, the 
optimal dimension of ν will be determined under two different situations. In the 
first scenario, the planner considers market effects (i.e. interaction between firms 
and consumers) but not environmental effects from the green area within the 
population. In a second scenario, the planner considers market effects but includes the 
consequences from the green zone for city inhabitants. 
4.1. Optimal size of the green area under pure market effects
In this situation, the regulator does not take into account any externalities generated 
by the green area, thus, only market interactions between consumers and firms are 
considered. The analysis of this case is particularly interesting since it shows how 
the regulator might change the way the market works when choosing the dimension 
of a non-residential area. The goal is to examine changes in the behaviour of firms in 
terms of location and price. The welfare function of the regulator W1(v) is expressed 
as a linear combination of firms’ profits πi*(v), i = 1, 2 and the total surplus for the 
population from buying the good Et*(v). This can be formalized as follows:
W1(v) = λ(π1*(v) + π2*(v)) + (1 – λ) Et*(v) (11)
By substituting π1*(v), π2*(v) and ET*(v) with their respective expressions (8) and (10), 
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The optimal size associated with pure market effects is given by νOM (see equation 
13). The most important result arising here is that the optimal size is not dependent 
on transportation cost per unit of distance (t), but only on the bias towards firms 
from the regulator (λ). It can be concluded that zoning regulation under a constant 
demand can either increase or decrease competition depending on the value of λ. 
We can identify three distinct cases, depending on the value of λ: 
Firstly, the case 0 ≤ λ ≤ 0.44, corresponds to a situation where a greater weight 
is attached to consumer’s welfare in terms of global welfare. The residential-
commercial area reaches a maximum extension, vOM = 0, therefore, city inhabitants 
will enjoy more welfare in terms of space. The welfare function is equal to 
W1(0) = N{(1/8)t (7λ – 4) + (1 – λ)[S – c]}.
The solution is the same as under consumers’ favourite option because the 
location of firms (given by x1* = 1/4, x2* = 3/4) are socially optimal. In other 
words, the outcome vOM = 0 corresponds to a situation in which a greater weight is 
attached to consumer’s welfare in terms of global welfare given that λ ∈[0, 0.44]. 
Consequently, the firm competition is intense.
Secondly, when λ = 0.44, an optimum will be reached for ∀	v ∈[0,	1], the social 
welfare function is constant and independent from the size of the environmental 
area v. The welfare function is equal to W1(v) = (N/9) [–t + 5(S – c)], thus, 
decreasing with respect to t. The regulator is neutral. What this is means is that 
the regulator is indifferent on the size of the green area and may, therefore, take 
arbitrary decisions. In any case, under this solution, the optimal locations are: 
x1*(vOM) = 0.25(1 – vOM), and x2*(vOM) = 0.25(3 + vOM).
Lastly, when 0.44 ≤ λ ≤ 1, the optimal green area extends along the whole city 
vOM = v̂. Given this total range of values for the weight factor, the regulator 
overvalues consumers’ preferences when λ ∈[0.44, 1/2). However, if λ ∈[1/2, 1), 
the planner attaches a higher weight to firms over consumers. In the particular case 
corresponding to λ = 1/2 the social optimum minimizes the total transport costs. 
In consequence, consumers are located at the extremes of the city and competition 
among firms is weak. The solution is similar to firms’ preferred option. In this case, 
the welfare function is equal to: W1(v) = N{t(2λ – 1) + (1 – λ)[S – c]}. Given that 
this expression is increasing with respect to t for λ ∈(1/2, 1], the optimal locations 
of firms will be x1* = 0, and x2* = 0, respectively. 
4.2. Optimal size of green area: a general study
This is the most general case as the planner takes into consideration both: market 
effects and green zone externalities. The optimal dimension of v will be determined 
using the equilibrium results obtained in the previous section and expression (3) from 
the regulator’s welfare function that includes the total environmental effect, Im(v). 
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Therefore, welfare might also be reformulated as: W2(v) = W1(v) + (1 – λ)Im(v). 
Substituting W1(v), and Im(v) with their respective expressions (12) and (2) the 































































For λ = 1, that is, the regulator does not take into account consumers’ preferences, 
the welfare function from the regulator W2(v) will equal the added benefit of 
the duopolistic firms π*(v). Therefore, this entails a similar case to both firms 
choosing the size of the green area. Thus, the optimal dimension of the green area 
is vOG = v̂. 
For λ ≠	1, with 0 ≤ λ < 1, the welfare function (equation 14) can be rewritten as: 































This expression (16) for the welfare function easily allows the determination of the 
optimal size of the green area as shown below:
Proposition 2:






=  is 
given by: 
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where v*(t, γ, λ) = (1/2)(γ + t f(λ) with f(λ) as defined in expression (16.1).
Proof: (see appendix).
The optimal size vOG, defined in expression (17), depends on the interrelation 
between the environmental preference of consumers (γ), the transportation cost per 
unit of distance (t), and the weight (λ) attached to firms by the regulator. 
As the value γ increases the optimal size of the green area becomes bigger until it 
takes all available space. Thus, depending on the values of the above parameters, 
three solutions are obtained. However, both the value and the growth rate of the 
size, vOG, depend on the sign of f(λ) define in equation (16.1) and consequently on 
the different values the bias (λ) takes. 
When λ ∈ [0, 0.44], f(λ) ≤ 0, the regulator has a clear bias towards the interests 
of consumers in which case it is moderately inclined to set a green zone and will 
only promote it when a certain positive threshold is reached for the environmental 
preferences of consumers γ, (0 ≤ –t  f(λ) ≤ γ). Furthermore, as long as transportation 
cost per unit of distance is increased, the space allocated for the green area will go up. 
Notice that when λ = 0.44, f(λ) = 0, the optimal size is independent from 
transportation cost per unit of distance, t, and the regulator’s decision becomes 
similar to the case when market effects are not taken into consideration. 
When λ ∈ [0.44, 1), f(λ) ≥ 0, a bias towards firms is observed, and the trend in 
favour of a green area sharpens as the value of the bias λ13 increases. In this sense, 
the regulator implements a green area once a low value for the spatial preferences, 
γ, (γ = –t f(λ) ≤ 0) is reached, even though consumers have a preference for more 
residential space. 
The environmental preference of consumers has an upper and a lower bound, 
–t f(λ) ≤ γ ≤ 2 – t f(λ) whereas the optimal size of the green area v* = (1/2)(γ + t f(λ)), 
is noticeably higher when λ ∈ [0.44, 1), than when λ ∈ [0, 0.44].
In the recent literature, the articles closest to the research presented here are 
Hamoudi and Risueño (2012), and Bárcena and Casado (2014). We then set out our 
contributions in comparison to those articles.
13 For λ ∈[0.44,1), f (λ) it increases very rapidly.
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In the paper by Hamoudi and Risueño (2012), the authors make use of zoning in a 
circular market under spatial discrimination without the adoption of discrimination 
in prices, and without the consideration of environmental or urban issues. In 
consequence, they obtain two extreme results (a “weak competition” versus a 
“strong competition”) according to the regulatory bias between consumers and 
firms.
From the regulation structure presented in Hamoudi and Risueño (2012), the paper 
by Bárcena and Casado (2014) analyses zoning in a linear market under spatial 
competition with discrimination in prices. The key difference of our contribution 
in comparison to this article is, however, to analyse the tradeoff of the effects for 
environmental improvements and for a greater congestion on both the location and 
the equilibrium prices of firms.
In sum, our contribution to spatial literature lies in the analysis of the zoning 
taking into account the effects of environmental and urban topics under a 
spatial discrimination model with Bertrand competition. This change in model 
specification significantly affects results. In particular, we obtain a broader result in 
terms of prices and locations: a “weak competition” (v* = 0), a “strong competition” 
(v* = v̂), and an intermediate competition v*(λ) ∈ [0, v̂], which depends also on the 
regulator’s bias.
In economic terms, this model teaches us when planning the design of cities 
how to impose restrictions on the locations of companies taking into account 
the environmental aspects. In addition, that environmental policy can increase 
competition between companies and positively affect the welfare of consumers.
5. Conclusions
This study introduces an environmental area in a Hotelling’s linear city with 
the objective of analysing the social welfare. This zoning model considers the 
implications in terms of the firm’s decision on location and the well-being of 
consumers.
On the one hand, constraining the location of firms to a specified area might be used 
as an industrial policy instrument by a regulator aiming to redistribute economic 
activity to certain areas. This type of intervention, therefore, influences the degree 
of competition in the market. 
On the other hand, the existence of a green area affects welfare levels of citizens 
through their “quality of life”. Given that the green zone may not be inhabited by 
consumers, two externalities arise. A positive externality because of environmental 
improvements and the possibility of enjoying the space for leisure. And a negative 
externality linked to the increase of population density (i.e. congestion effect) 
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brings about a disutility for consumers. As a consequence, the net effect from the 
green area on citizens’ welfare must be calculated by formalizing the magnitude 
and direction of both externalities. 
One of the contributions of this paper is a comprehensive specification that relies 
on the relationship among three key factors: the bias of the regulator towards firms 
or consumers, the transportation cost and the environmental effects. Evidently, 
the outcome depends on all of them. In this framework, optimal policies are 
obtained according to a weighted welfare function. It is shown that location 
and price competition might be stronger or weaker depending on the size of the 
environmental area. Thus, the main policy implication of this paper (i.e. in line with 
regulation literature) is to underline the role of zoning regulation as an influential 
competition policy tool.
Firstly, only market effects without externalities from the green area are considered. 
Under this hypothesis, the main result is that zoning policy is independent from 
transportation costs and, in consequence, the solution only depends on the regulator 
bias. In particular, if the bias is towards consumers, the outcome favours them. In 
contrast, when the regulator is biased towards firms, the outcome favours them. 
Interestingly, we identify a value of the parameter in the welfare function (λ = 0.44) 
for which the regulator becomes neutral – undecided on the size of the green area. 
This can lead to arbitrary decisions. 
Finally, a more general context is analysed in which the regulator takes into account 
the market effects and negative externalities associated to the green zone. We find 
that the optimal size of the green zone depends on the bias from the regulator, 
the transportation cost per unit of distance and the externalities due to congestion 
versus environmental quality. The most relevant aspect here is that the introduction 
of transportation costs imposes more restrictive conditions on a regulator when 
implementing a green area in the city. Moreover, this effect increases when there 
exists a bias to benefit consumers.
An interesting extension of these results for future research would be to attach 
some value to space (land) by including another parameter in the utility function of 
consumers and firms. This approach would introduce a highly realistic assumption 
in the design of green areas in large cities where social urban dynamics (i.e. 
gentrification) is already taken place. Moreover, growth and city-design in new 
spaces could also be analysed by using a similar setup to the one in this paper. In 
this case, the length of this space will, therefore, become a strategic variable for the 
regulator.
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Uredba zelenog prostornog uređenja pod diskriminacijom cijena1
Hamid Hamoudi2, María J. Moral3
Sažetak
Ova studija ima za cilj ispitati urbano prostorno uređenje unutar linearnog grada 
u okviru Bertrandovog duopolskog natjecanja s diskriminacijom cijena i linearnim 
transportnim troškovima linearnog prijevoza. Analiziraju se učinci uvođenja 
područja zaštite okoliša u kojima gospodarska i stambena aktivnost nisu 
dopuštene. Funkcija blagostanja koja se koristi za određivanje optimalne veličine 
zelenog područja omogućava eventualnu pristranost regulatora u korist tvrtki/
potrošača. Konkurencija za lokacijsku cijenu može utjecati na smanjenje ili 
povećanje cijene ovisno o veličini zelene površine. Rezultati ukazuju na to da 
regulator koji provodi zeleno zoniranje, pod linearnim troškovima prijevoza, 
utječe na optimalno mjesto poduzeća (jer ta mjesta ovise o veličini zelene zone). 
Kao posljedica toga, zoniranje se može koristiti kao učinkovit alat industrijske ili 
urbane politike.
Ključne riječi: prostorna diskriminacija, duopol, zoniranje, utjecaji na okoliš
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Proof of proposition 1:






















The derivative of W1(v) is given by: дW1(v)/дv = (1/8)t(9λ – 4). Therefore, it is shown 
that: дW1(v)/дv ≤ 0, is λ ∈ [0, 0.44] and дW1(v)/дv ≥ 0, if λ ∈ [0.44, 1].

























Proof of proposition 2:
Let W2(v) be a welfare function given by: W2(v) = N(1 – λ){–v2 + [γ + t  f(λ)]v + K}, 
where f(λ) and K are defined in the main text.











1 λγ ftv +=∗ . It can then be verified when v* ∈ [0, v̂] and when not:
v* ≤ 0 ↔ γ ≤ –t  f(λ)
0 ≤ v* ≤ v̂ ↔ –t  f(λ) ≤ γ ≤ 2 – t  f(λ)
v* ≥ v̂ ↔ 2 – t  f(λ) ≤ γ
Then:
















For 2 – t  f(λ) ≤ γ, which implies v* ≥ v̂ . In this case it is shown that:
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